A democratic constitution for plural Guyana

Talk of “Constitutional change” continues to dominate political discussion emanating from several quarters in Guyana. But they seem to be placing the cart before the horse by focusing on their cause celebre in a vacuum, and not paying enough attention to the substantive values — encompassed by the omnibus term “democracy” — that constitutions and constitutionalism seek to implement. Democracy, however, like most value-concepts, can only be appreciated within its historical context and development. We must always keep in mind the historical specificity of all institutions. This is another point that the partisans of “constitutional change” studiously avoid in their utterances.
The political institutions of Guyana were directly imposed on Guyana by the European colonial powers – which since 1803 meant Britain. In Britain, the development of the democratic idea went hand in hand with the development of Liberalism; and for most Britishers the two were coterminous, especially during the phase of struggling for constitutional government. They are not, and the famous distinction by F.A. Hayek is apropos: “Liberalism is concerned with the functions of government, and particularly with the limitation of all its powers. Democracy is concerned with the question of who is to direct government. Liberalism requires that all power, and therefore also that of the majority, be limited. Democracy came to regard current majority opinion as the only criterion of the legitimacy of the powers of government.”
As we trace the development of democracy, which the British insisted should be practised by Guyanese, it would do us well to keep in mind the distinction occasioned by the exigencies of the British experience. Western constitutionalism arose out of the struggle for personal freedom and escape from arbitrary political will. Guyanese should certainly resonate to this struggle. Constitutionalism is a foundation stone of Liberalism, and defines a political scheme in which law, rather than men, is supreme. Political authority is exercised according to law, which is to be obeyed by, all including the governors, who cannot depart from it by whim. By definition then, a constitutional government is a limited government.
But the Constitution must address the specificities and peculiarities of our social circumstances, and this we avoid. Unlike Britain, we are the paradigmatic “plural society”, where the culturally defined various groups were differentially integrated into the power relations, steering our politics in a pattern of ethnic mobilisation within “democratic” rules of governance set by the constitution. Unfortunately, the premises of the political system and its Constitution still reflect the biases of Liberalism, in which the supposedly rational individual engages in a variety of roles, and belong to a multitude of organizations and groups whose several interests are “cross-cutting”. The individual makes decisions based on the particular role he is playing when he confronts the given issue. In his political role as a voter, therefore, he makes a “rational” choice based on the position a given party takes on the issues before the electorate. Even if all voters do not conform to this ideal, there are enough who do to constitute a pool of “swing” votes for which all parties compete.

As such, while there will always be blocs of voters who vote “traditionally”, there will also always be a substantial bloc of “undecideds”. This situation creates a centripetal, moderating effect, and the parties line up on a continuum on the issues. Since these swing voters may always change their minds, the majority is always careful to be respectful to the minority. The essential principle is audi alteram partem – hear the other side. Additionally, the multiple membership in organisations that creates the cross-cutting cleavages help to ensure that the party out of office still has other avenues outside of the explicit political institutions for ensuring that their views are considered by those in power.
But with our entrenched ethnic voting, the challenge for the “constitutionalists” is to accept that changes in political behaviour will only occur after changes in political consciousness. To assume otherwise is to engage in spinning wheels.