The following article by Dr Augusto Teixeira explores Brazil’s strategic response, highlighting potential security risks in the region.
“The ongoing territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region is a major security concern for Brazil, which has a large land border with Venezuela and Guyana, and is already facing the challenges of the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis. A Venezuelan invasion of Guyana and the subsequent annexation of Essequibo by force would create severe security problems for Brazil.
Politically, the Amazon is the main topic on which Brazil’s Government gains leverage in the global arena. The Amazon is crucial to Brazil in debates about global warming, green politics, economic development, and the responsible exploitation of the jungle’s resources. From a defence and security perspective, the Amazon Forest is considered a sensitive security and defence subject, specifically related to the fear of influence from extra-regional powers. From the geopolitical perspective of a country that sees itself as a regional power, the northern flank, where the Essequibo region is located and the Amazon is paramount, is considered Brazil’s backyard. It is reasonable to anticipate that Brazil would take measures to prevent a potential escalation from a crisis to a war between Venezuela and Guyana. It is stated in Brazil’s National Defence Policy and Strategy that the Amazon is one of the country’s main geostrategic areas of interest, crucial for its security and defence.
For over a decade, Brazil has augmented its military presence through the Amazon regions with increased personnel and means, and the reorganisation of military units. So, what is wrong with how President Lula’s government has dealt with the Venezuela-Guyana crisis? Although Brazilian diplomatic tradition rests on the peaceful resolution of crises and conflicts, the country’s most essential documents regarding defence policy and strategy declare that deterrence is its primary strategic posture. Deterrence is a form of strategic coercion that implies the possibility of using force to leverage threats. It aims to deter someone from initiating an action not in our interest. As pointed out by Schelling, it is a kind of diplomacy. However, due to the region’s sensitivity to conflict, and what is in it for Brazil’s interest, is Brazil acting to deter Venezuela? Not as it would be expected, based on what deterrence means.
On a political and diplomatic level, Brazil is soft on the President of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro. Brazil has mainly been using its diplomatic channels to hold Maduro from his violent intent. However, it is not deterrence, as taught by strategic theory or by what Brazilian defence documents state. In the symbolic realm, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often referred to as Itamaraty, stated publicly that the Essequibo referendum was a domestic Venezuelan issue, when in fact it was a destabilising political action with potential effects on Brazil. In the defence and military realm, Brazil’s defence minister stated that the country would not allow the use of Brazilian territory in the case of a conflict escalating to war.
However, despite having relevant military bases, personnel, and equipment throughout the Amazonian region, there was no signal of credible military build-up near the possible conflict area. The public announcement confirmed the transfer of approximately 20 military vehicles to the capital of Roraima in a month, and the increase of the Special Border Platoon in Pacaraima with over 60 soldiers.
The characteristics of the Brazilian response to Venezuela’s strategic challenge on its northern border make it clear that Brazil does not have a conventional deterrence strategy or posture. Despite having deterrence as the primary strategic posture in its national defence documents, neither the political level nor the military presents coherent signs that aim to deter Maduro’s invasion of the Guyana Essequibo region. Although it provided clear signals that it wouldn’t allow Venezuela’s use of Brazilian territory to attack Guyana (direct deterrence), Brasilia failed to provide extended deterrence to the threatened country (Guyana), precisely what the US did.
Brazil’s failure to successfully communicate its capability and credibility in deterring a neighbouring revisionist state, thereby relying on external powers, clearly indicates that Brazil, along with its strategic culture, lacks a proper understanding of deterrence.”
