Our Foreign Service was forced to respond sharply to the Chinese restatement of Venezuela’s strategic demand for their position on their manufactured border controversy; to wit, that it should be resolved through “consultations and negotiations”. This was clearly a slap in the face of us meticulously following the fundamental and arguably oldest principle of international law, “pacta sunt servanda – “agreements must be kept”. Without such a rule, no international agreement would be binding or enforceable. The Geneva Agreement of 1966, signed by both Venezuela and us, defined the path we have chosen to the ICJ to resolve the controversy, which threatens our very existence, as agreed by that august apex court itself. Many have asked then, why would the Chinese insist that they have “Put China-Guyana Friendship First”, even as they favour Venezuela.
One answer to the seemingly contradictory Chinese position was recently proposed by the Hoover Institution in an article, “The Sources of the Chinese Communist Party’s Strategic Duplicity”. Below we offer excerpts that should be helpful towards understanding China’s adumbrations: “The Chinese Communist Party’s strategic duplicity is profoundly shaped by the fusion of Warring States-era realpolitik with Marxist dialectical thinking. Each of these intellectual traditions brings a unique perspective: Warring States realpolitik emphasizes pragmatism, deception, and unprincipled flexibility, while Marxist dialectical thinking provides a framework for understanding and manipulating contradictions to drive progress. Together, these two perspectives offer the CCP a toolkit of strategies for managing complex and conflicting interests both domestically and internationally, enabling a highly adaptive and multilayered approach to governance that frequently is duplicitous.
“The Warring States Period (475–221 BC) taught Chinese leaders that the most effective approach to power was to use deception, exploit weaknesses, and form opportunistic alliances without regard for strict principles or ideological commitments. This period, marked by intense competition and survivalist tactics among rival states, gave rise to a form of realpolitik that valued flexibility and strategic ambiguity as essential to statecraft. In the CCP’s strategy, this ancient pragmatic thinking complements Marxist dialectical principles, which view contradictions as inherent to social and political life and as engines for change.
“In practice, this means the CCP can hold contradictory positions —appearing committed to ideological principles while adapting to practical needs —without seeing these contradictions as weaknesses. For example, China’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” combines market practices with socialist rhetoric, a synthesis that seems paradoxical but is framed as necessary for China’s progress. This synthesis is possible because dialectical thinking allows the CCP to see capitalism and socialism not as irreconcilable, but as forces that can coexist within a managed contradiction, which the Warring States tradition further allows them to exploit through unprincipled pragmatism.
“The CCP’s duplicitous approach to international relations is a clear example of how these two traditions combine to support strategic duplicity. From a Warring States realpolitik perspective, China pursues alliances and economic partnerships that serve its immediate goals, even if these partnerships may be temporary or inherently contradictory. For instance, China maintains economic relationships with Western nations, benefitting from global trade and investment –– while simultaneously acts contradictorily to the foundational principles of the Western free market system, aligning itself with states that challenge Western influence, such as Russia and North Korea. This duality is made coherent through dialectical thinking, which interprets these contradictions as part of a larger strategic progression toward a more favourable world order.
“Dialectical thinking further justifies China’s contradictory alliances by framing them as temporary stages in a long-term historical process. Marxist dialectic views history as a progression driven by class struggle and competing interests, with contradictions inevitably leading to change. From this perspective, China’s engagement with Western economies is seen not as an ideological compromise, but as a necessary step in China’s development — a stage that can eventually give way to a more dominant position where China could assert its ideological preferences more openly. Warring States realpolitik, with its emphasis on strategic patience and shifting alliances, provides the tactical means for executing this long-term dialectical strategy through pragmatic, often deceptive diplomacy.”
