China’s tilt towards Venezuela was once again declared last week, when the Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy was asked to comment on the Venezuelan Naval warship’s incursion into Guyana’s EEZ last month to accost the Exxon/Hess/ CNOOC FPSO. The Charge d’Affaires’ answer directly addressed the raison d’etre for the Venezuelan violation when he responded, “They can solve the border issue through friendly consultations and negotiations.” This, of course, adopts Venezuela’s position on the border controversy, in which they claim all of the Essequibo, and which Maduro has single-mindedly pursued through a hybrid war strategy.
China has thus accepted Venezuela’s self-serving interpretation of the 1966 Geneva Agreement, which Venezuela signed with Guyana to establish a mechanism to settle Venezuela’s controversy that the 1899 Arbitral Award that settled our border was void. The Geneva Agreement, in merely eight Articles, mandated the formation of a Mixed Commission (Arts 1 to 3) that would meet and produce biannual reports. If, after four years (by 1970), there was no agreement, “Those Governments shall without delay choose one of the means of peaceful settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the UN.”
In 1970, however, a 12-year moratorium was agreed to, and, in 1982, the two governments resorted to the “Good Offices” of the UN Secty General, in which individuals acceptable to both sides mediated.
The “Good Offices” process continued through 2017, when the Secretary General, as per the Geneva Agreement, in Jan 2018, invoked Art 33 of the UN Charter and chose the ICJ as the next step. In March 2018, Guyana resorted to that institution to adjudge and declare that the 1899 Arbitral Award definitively delineated our border.
Venezuela objected to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, and kept insisting on “direct negotiations”, where it clearly thinks it can browbeat Guyana against the background of the hybrid warfare it launched in 2013 when it seized an Exxon-contracted oil exploration ship.
In Dec 2020, however, the World Court declared it did have such jurisdiction – a position Venezuela continued to reject even as it made submissions, along with Guyana.
Based on the foregoing, the Chinese suggestion on further “consultations and negotiations” was pro-Venezuelan and anti-Guyanese, to the extent that our Foreign Policy establishment was forced to bluntly declare: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation rejects the statements made on April 16, 2025, by the Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of the Republic of China.”
The Government also noted: “There has been no comment from the Government of China on the blatant announcement by Venezuela that it intends to conduct elections on 25 May 2025 for a governor and legislative council of “Guayana Esequiba State”, which is the name Venezuela has given to Guyana’s Essequibo region.”
China is attempting to play both sides against the middle; since, not only does it have massive economic interests in Venezuela, where it props up the failed Maduro regime, but it defends the latter’s efforts to annex Essequibo because of its own history.
Between 1949 and 1951, China invaded and annexed Tibet, which had been independent and part of the modern state system since 1912.
Conversely, China has forcibly denied the Turkic Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang their UN-guaranteed right to self-determination.
We must not be fooled by China’s claim that it has “Put China-Guyana Friendship First”. As I wrote in late March, “In September 2023, even as Venezuela was once again rattling sabres on our western borders by proposing to hold a referendum to annex Essequibo, China upgraded their relations with that country into the highest possible “all-weather strategic partnership” – and remained silent on the above-mentioned Venezuelan Navy corvette invading our EEZ and threatening the FPSO Lisa Destiny, even though it owns CNOOC, which has a 25% stake in the operating condominium.
China must not be allowed to get away with proverbially running with the hares and hunting with the hounds.
While there are no permanent friends or enemies in foreign affairs, at this juncture, we support President Ali’s adumbration: “The U.S. is a great friend of ours. The U.S. has made it very clear that they are ready to stand by us in our development, in our economic expansion, in our security and in our defence. And I will say very boldly that such friends must have some different and preferential treatment, because a friend who will defend me when I need a friend to defend me must be a friend that enjoys some special place in our heart and in our country; that will be the case.”
