Countering New Terrorism

President Irfaan Ali’s warning about possible Tren de Aragua activity in Guyana demands a practical response. Back when Maduro was escalating the annexation of our Essequibo, we introduced the notion of “hybrid warfare”, wherein non-ballistic methods, such as infiltration by criminal gangs to create internal disorder, could be deployed. At that time, the Government declared it was increasing the screening and checks of refugees from Venezuela. It is our hope that by now, they have converted the information into intelligence that aids prevention, investigations, and cases against these criminals capable of surviving scrutiny in court.
The regional experience supplies ample reason for vigilance. Tren de Aragua established criminal cells in Colombia, Peru, and Chile by exploiting refugee routes and preying on vulnerable Venezuelans. Their documented activities include extortion, kidnapping, trafficking, money laundering, and contract killings, and have shown them to be an adaptable criminal enterprise that seeks opportunities wherever institutions leave openings. From this perspective, the possibility of political recruitment cannot be dismissed, especially by politicians who have shown a proclivity for criminal activity.
As we have suggested before, our state’s first requirement should therefore be a permanent investigative team bringing together Police, immigration, financial investigators, prosecutors, and Spanish-speaking analysts. Its task should be to establish identities, connect incidents, and identify local facilitators while creating files on threats, weapons, suspicious payments, and accommodations that separately may conceal a single network unless someone is responsible for joining the evidence. Registration and identity checks at entry points clearly help, but nationality or undocumented status cannot establish gang membership. We must make our Venezuelan communities a source of intelligence by providing confidential reporting in Spanish, interpreters, and credible witness protection.
International cooperation must become operational, and in addition to the intelligence provided by US authorities, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Brazil possess experience and information that could help us check identities and investigate suspected affiliations. INTERPOL channels can also be utilised where appropriate. We must be very careful not to treat every Venezuelan as a suspect since this would undermine intelligence gathering.
The authorities must also follow the money, which the evidence shows can be very sophisticated. Chilean investigators, for instance, exposed an alleged laundering network involving companies, bank accounts, and cryptocurrency. We should examine suspected criminal financing and local support with equal determination. If political operatives are commissioning violence, investigators must establish the instructions, intermediaries, and payments – whoever the evidence implicates. However, from what is already in the public domain, we know that vast sums of money are already being pumped into political mobilisation that can simply be redirected into other areas.
Meanwhile, with the attacks we have already experienced over the last two years, electricity, water, and communications facilities require immediate security reviews. However, one area we have not focused enough on is prisons – where many gangs like Tren de Aragua were formed. We must prevent our prisons from being gang incubators and have operations continuing inside by strengthening controls on illicit phones, money, and corrupt staff, with lawful monitoring and appropriate separation based on assessed risk. Peru’s investigations included prison-cell searches – a reminder that imprisonment alone does not necessarily interrupt a network. Arresting a suspect achieves little if the network continues operating.
Finally, public communication must be disciplined. Citizens should know what is confirmed, what remains an intelligence assessment, and what investigators are seeking to establish. Premature accusations can prejudice investigations and damage public confidence. Guyana need not wait for a criminal network to become entrenched before acting. The regional lesson is to intervene early, protect witnesses, disrupt financing, and build sound prosecutions. The measure of success will be whether the threatened violence is prevented and whether those organising or paying for it can be proved responsible.
While we are not claiming that criminal networks have already been established, we would be foolish to ignore the regional lesson to act early against identifiable people, finances, and support structures – and measure success by disrupted operations and sustainable convictions. That would also give substance to President Ali’s warning if the alleged political connections are borne out.