Home Letters Fallacy of equating philanthropic popularity with political electability
Dear Editor,
Introduction: The assumption that public admiration for philanthropic endeavours seamlessly translates into political electability is a misconception that warrants critical examination.
In societies where democratic elections are conducted, history has repeatedly demonstrated that the qualities that make an individual popular in one domain do not necessarily render that individual electable in another.
Figures such as Mr. Azruddin Mohamed, a prominent businessman and philanthropist, have garnered significant public attention and admiration for their charitable efforts. However, appreciation for an individual’s generosity or social contributions does not equate to the electorate’s confidence in their ability to govern at the national and international levels, let alone navigate the complexities of statecraft.
Guyanese voters are not politically naïve, nor do they make electoral decisions based purely on admiration.
The electorate has consistently demonstrated that being well liked in one sphere of life – whether philanthropy, activism, or media – does not automatically translate into political viability or electability. In Guyana’s unique political landscape, where entrenched racial and party affiliations historically shape voting patterns, the barriers to political success are structural, not sentimental.
Guyanese precedents: When popularity failed to secure political power
Guyana’s electoral history is replete with examples of individuals who, despite commanding significant public respect in various fields, failed to translate that into electoral success. These cases underscore a critical lesson: voter admiration and voter trust in governance are two distinct realities.
1: Mr Ravi Dev and the Rise, Organize, and Rebuild (ROAR) Party: Mr. Ravi Dev, a prominent advocate for Indo-Guyanese rights, founded the ROAR Party to address the specific concerns of that community. Despite his activism and the party’s targeted agenda, ROAR secured only 0.93% of the vote in the 2001 General Elections, yielding a single parliamentary seat. This outcome illustrates that even focused advocacy and community-specific platforms do not necessarily lead to broad electoral success.
2: Mr C.N. Sharma and the Justice For All Party (JFAP): Mr C.N. Sharma, a household name due to his long-running television programme Justice For All, built a reputation for championing the rights of the poor and disenfranchised. His national popularity was undeniable. However, when he attempted to translate that goodwill into political success by forming the Justice For All Party (JFAP), his electoral performance was underwhelming. In the 2006 General Elections, despite his widespread name recognition, his party secured just one parliamentary seat, reinforcing the stark distinction between being admired and being electable.
3: The Working People’s Alliance (WPA): Recognition without electoral impact: The WPA serves as a textbook example of political recognition failing to convert into electoral success. Despite being among the most historically recognized political parties in Guyana, with its name being deeply associated with activism and the legacy of Dr. Walter Rodney, it has never commanded significant electoral support. The numbers speak for themselves: 1.4% of the vote in 1985, 2% in 1992, and 1.2% in 1997.
Even after aligning with the Guyana Action Party in 2001, it barely secured two seats in Parliament.
For decades, the WPA has remained widely known but electorally insignificant, proving beyond doubt that familiarity and ideological appeal do not automatically translate into votes.
4: Mr Mark Benschop: Media recognition without political success: Mr. Mark Benschop, a high-profile activist and journalist, was one of the most visible antigovernment figures of his time. His grassroots presence and strong following suggested the emergence of a formidable political force. However, when he ran as an independent presidential candidate in 2015, his performance at the polls was abysmal. His campaign fell victim to the rigid realities of Guyanese political culture, where independent candidates struggle to gain traction outside of the two dominant parties. Public engagement, activism, and media prominence alone were insufficient to make him electorally viable.
5: The Myth of the AFC as a true, independent success story: One might argue that the Alliance For Change (AFC) contradicts this analysis, given its initial electoral success. However, a deeper examination of the AFC’s trajectory reveals a critical political reality: The AFC was never truly independent.
Founded in 2005, the party was primarily composed of defectors from the two major political parties, most notably Mr. Raphael Trotman from the PNC and Mr. Khemraj Ramjattan from the PPP. The very nature of its leadership and messaging positioned it not as a challenge to the PPP-PNC duopoly, but rather as a moderate, palatable alternative within it.
In the 2006 General Elections, the AFC secured 8.1% of the vote, translating to five parliamentary seats. However, this initial success was not a result of an independent third-party movement gaining traction in a vacuum. Rather, it occurred because PPP supporters, in particular, did not perceive the AFC as a fundamental threat to their traditional party allegiance. Instead, many viewed supporting the AFC as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with the PPP while maintaining ideological proximity.
The AFC’s miscalculation of its support base proved fatal. When it later aligned itself with the PNC as part of the A Partnership for National Unity (APNU) coalition, it lost its original support. PPP-aligned voters abandoned it in droves, proving that their initial backing had been contingent on the AFC’s perceived ideological alignment with the PPP.
This underscores a crucial lesson: Guyanese voters do not support true political independents in large numbers. rather, they support variations of their existing party loyalties.
The perils of misinterpreting public support: Public admiration in one domain does not automatically transfer into political electability. Guyanese voters tend to evaluate individuals within the context of their expertise, but being well liked in philanthropy, media, activism, or local governance does not mean the electorate will entrust them with national leadership.
Political candidates are judged based on specific leadership qualities, including policy vision, decisiveness, ethical integrity, governance experience, and international credibility; not merely generosity or media presence.
Conclusion: While philanthropy and social influence undoubtedly shape public perception, they do not serve as reliable indicators of political viability. Aspiring political figures must be cautious not to overestimate the transferability of their popularity across different spheres. The Guyanese electorate is discerning in its political judgment, and history has repeatedly demonstrated that success in one domain does not guarantee success in another.
Moreover, in a society deeply entrenched in racial and partisan voting patterns, independent candidates or challengers to the PPP/PNC power structure face overwhelming odds. If figures such as Mr Azruddin Mohamed aspire to enter the political arena, their most viable strategy would be to attach themselves to an existing major party, rather than attempt an independent challenge. Otherwise, they risk becoming yet another case study in the long history of popular figures who failed at the ballot box.
Final Thought: The Future of Independent Politics in Guyana: History suggests that true political independence remains an illusion in Guyana. However, as global politics evolve and voters seek more nuanced representation, future generations may redefine the electoral landscape. Until then, any aspirant operating outside of the PPP-PNC structure must learn to navigate the system or face inevitable irrelevance.
Yours sincerely,
Prof Dr Stanley
Anthony Vivion Paul