Guyana must modernise its anti-money laundering and financial crime laws

Dear Editor,
Australia’s recent Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) Amendment Act has quietly set a new global benchmark for integrity in financial regulation.
It broadens the reach of that country’s laws beyond banks to the professions and sectors most vulnerable to hidden wealth, including real estate, gold and jewellery dealers, accountants, lawyers, and trust-service providers.
It also strengthens the rules for digital and virtual assets, demands more transparent customer due diligence, and gives its financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC, far greater powers to compel information and enforce compliance. The message from Australia is clear: modern economies cannot protect their reputation or investment inflows unless they keep pace with new forms of financial crime.
Guyana, to its credit, has built a working anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing regime since 2009, strengthened through successive amendments and the work of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the National Coordination Committee, and the Special Organised Crime Unit. The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) now rates roughly 88 per cent of our legislative framework as compliant or largely compliant.
But the question is not whether we have laws on paper; it is whether those laws are strong, comprehensive, and modern enough to confront the realities on the ground.  And the realities are sobering. Over the past year alone, the country has witnessed high-profile investigations into gold-smuggling networks, customs fraud, and official corruption involving sums that dwarf ordinary commerce.
The Mohamed Enterprise affair, now before United States courts, exposed how vast amounts of unaccounted gold allegedly left our shores through falsified declarations and bribed officials.  At home, there are continuing revelations of how loopholes in the gold-declaration system and the under-regulation of high-risk professions have enabled illicit enrichment.
Recent enforcement drives, though welcome, have also highlighted how offenders often escape with minimal consequences. Many are released on bail, while others face years of procedural delay before cases are resolved. Even more troubling are public allegations, now the subject of official attention, suggesting that individuals in positions of authority may have private interests that conflict with their public responsibilities.
These matters remain before the appropriate agencies, but they illustrate how thin the line between public office and private interest can become when enforcement is weak and transparency incomplete. When one compares our legal framework with the new Australian model, the gaps become clear. Australia’s reform extends its regime to what the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) calls “Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions”, the very sectors that, in Guyana, are most exposed to illicit finance.
Here, the supervision of real estate agents, lawyers, accountants, and dealers in precious metals remains limited and, in some cases, only nominal. Australia has also moved to regulate virtual-asset service providers, ensuring that cryptocurrency exchanges and digital wallets fall under clear due-diligence and reporting rules. Guyana’s current AML/CFT Act, drafted long before the rise of crypto and online transfers, does not yet cover this new frontier.
Guyana’s FIU and law-enforcement bodies have made significant progress, but their capacity, staffing, and investigatory reach remain limited by resources and procedural delays. Many cases linger in the courts for years, diluting the deterrent effect of the law. For Guyana, the stakes are high. Weaknesses in our AML regime threaten not only the integrity of our financial system but also our international reputation. Foreign banks have grown increasingly wary of correspondent relationships with countries viewed as high-risk or under-regulated.
If we do not modernise our framework, we risk losing access to the global financial arteries that connect our economy to trade, investment, and tourism. Upgrading our AML/CTF regime should therefore become a national security and governance priority. The reforms must be legislative, institutional, and cultural. Parliament should bring high-risk professions such as lawyers, accountants, real estate brokers, and gold dealers under explicit reporting and supervisory obligations. We must establish a register of beneficial ownership so that hidden interests behind companies and trusts are transparent to regulators and, where appropriate, to the public.
The law should be extended to virtual-asset businesses and updated to address modern typologies of cybercrime, proliferation financing, and sanctions evasion. Our FIU and SOCU need both greater independence and more technical expertise to investigate and prosecute cases swiftly. And, crucially, our courts require the resources to dispose of financial-crime matters within a reasonable time.
This is not merely about compliance with CFATF or FATF standards; it is about protecting Guyana’s emerging prosperity, our gold sector, our oil wealth, and our new financial institutions from being compromised by illicit flows and reputational risk.
It is also about ensuring that the benefits of growth are not syphoned off through corruption, tax evasion, and capital flight. And it is about demonstrating to our citizens and to the world that the rule of law in Guyana is not for sale.  Australia’s reforms remind us that the battle against financial crime never ends – it simply changes form. Guyana must show the same seriousness of purpose. We have the opportunity and the responsibility to build a system that is transparent, trusted, and future-proof. The time to act is now.

Yours sincerely,
Dr Walter H Persaud