Ignoring the (GPF) elephant in the room

Ever since the PPP was grudgingly returned to office last year, after the PNC’s attempted rigging was stymied by the international community, the Guyana Police Force (GPF) has been in the news. This is not surprising, given the role that institution has played – intentionally or unintentionally – in the politics of this country. Overwhelmingly staffed by what PNC leader Hoyte called “kith and kin” African Guyanese, the Guyana Police Force does not act as a deterrent to anti-Indian Guyanese violence emanating from the African Guyanese quarter. This started during the 1960s’ inaugural ethnic conflict, and remains the elephant in Guyana’s politics.
In September 1963, recounting the efforts of the UN to broker a settlement between the two parties after ethnic riots earlier in the year, when PPP leader Jagan’s car was stormed, Burnham said, “…he (Dr. Jagan) contended that the PNC already controlled the Police Force, and, if to the actual control which he said existed there were to be added the legal control, then he and his party would be in jeopardy, and to quote him accurately and precisely, ‘their heads would be in danger’.” Mr. Burnham concluded: “The People’s Progressive Party is now in fear, in absolute fear, of the People’s National Congress.”
Those words were prescient in light of the events at Wismar in 1964, when two Indians were murdered, hundreds beaten, several raped, 220 houses razed, and the entire Indian Guyanese population of 3399 were “ethnically cleansed”.
As reported by the British Governor-appointed COI: “Several members of the Police and Volunteers who gave evidence said that they had seen large crowds of people moving up and down, but committing no offense.” Witnesses, however, levelled a different series of charges against the forces: “These include bribery, partaking in loot, standing by and refusing to give assistance whilst rape and assault were being committed, to extinguish fires, supplying gasoline to arsonists, and being politically partial by telling people who were beaten and stripped to go to their political leaders.” This set the pattern for 1992, by which time unchecked “kick-down-the-door” banditry became endemic.
It continued during the 1992 elections, when PNC’s African supporters rioted in Georgetown against the Elections Commission, Indian Guyanese and businesses. The B.O. Adams COI investigated the riots and recommended that the Government ensure the Police Force be more ethnically balanced, and that the Government have a riot response plan to contain any future recurrence. The PPP mystifyingly buried the COI report, and refused to make any changes.
The denouement of the 1997 and 2001 elections, however, remained unchanged. Of the latter, former PM Sam Hinds wrote, “Following the 2002 jailbreak and their projection by key political factions as ‘Freedom Fighters’, the attacks on assumed supporters of the PPP/C were taken to a higher level. When the national security forces showed remarkable inability to apprehend them, it was inevitable that a similar irregular counter-force emerged.” He was referring to the so called “Phantom Squads” that, along with the bandits, turned Guyana into a killing field.
There was a lull after the Buxton Gang was eliminated in 2008, but, in September 2020, Police stood by and observed African Guyanese assaulting Indian Guyanese on the West Berbice Public Road during their protests over the Henrys’ murder. This partiality of the GPF had been addressed by the ICJ in 1965, the aforementioned BO Adams COI in 1992, and the Disciplined Forces Commission in 2004, of which David Granger was a member. They all agreed with the recommendations of the last, which was approved by Parliament in 2010:
“The Commission…is of the view that the allaying of ethnic security fears which stem from the predominance of Afro-Guyanese presence in the GPF must be addressed.” More specifically, it recommended: “It should be an aim (of the GPF) to achieve a Force representative of the ethnic diversity of the nation without employing a quota system.” To achieve this, ethnically-diverse recruitment teams should be employed as openly and extensively as possible. The report also suggested that a study be conducted on how to address the ethnic make-up imperative.
Writing in 1994, Ashton Chase referred to the recommendations to make the Force representative, and wondered whether “the main Opposition Party allowed these recommendations to go abegging for fear of being stigmatised as an ‘Indian party’.”
But the elephant in the room goes beyond that, and destabilises all Guyana. It must be removed.