Maduro’s ouster

Exactly 35 years to the day, January 3, 1989, that US forces removed strongman General Daniel Noriega of Panama to the US for trial as a narco-smuggler, US Delta Special Forces seized Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro, ostensibly for the same crime, and transported him, along with his wife, to the US. Following the US’s largest naval deployment in the hemisphere with one-quarter of their navy and blowing narco-boats out of the water and killing their crews, I had concluded on November 23, 2025, in “Dealing with Operation Southern Spear”:
“Their naval build-up concedes that the old strategy of sanctions, elections or wooing military leaders has been abandoned after repeated failures. But as we have stated repeatedly, while President Trump cannot afford to reinforce the mocking TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) label given after his position on tariffs, he also would not want to launch a scaled-up repetition of the 1989 invasion of Panama to remove General Noriega, also accused of narco-trafficking like Maduro. Americans are in no mood for body bags returning home as a result of a large force taking on house-to-house mopping-up operations after confronting Venezuela’s 100,000-plus armed forces. The option on the table is most likely bombings with ship-launched or drone missiles of strategic locations supporting a Special Operations raid to assassinate Maduro and his upper echelon leadership or at least foster defections in the latter. The present US warnings on aircraft being in Venezuelan airspace signal that this option might be imminent.”
Early yesterday morning, following a US FAA statement prohibiting US aircraft from operating within Venezuelan airspace, the military campaign began with videos on social media showing military helicopters firing at ground targets. Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) released a statement confirming that the US had launched missile strikes against Venezuela focused on “military targets”. They identified the Fort Tiuna military base in Caracas and the port of La Guaira, outside of Caracas, along with other sites in the states of Miranda, La Guaira, and Aragua.
Earlier in the week, a remote port from which drugs were shipped had been bombed, evidently by CIA operatives in the country. Then, a day before the US operation, Maduro had issued a statement in which he offered to “negotiate” with President Trump on all of the concerns the latter had raised: drugs, oil, investments, etc. It must have been evident to him that the US’ end game was imminent, especially after there was no response from the US. What is somewhat surprising is the lack of a response by the Venezuelan military that had announced its deployment of forces to counter the expected US action. The military has a sophisticated radar system that would have alerted them to the US helicopters that conducted the bombing raids and just as sophisticated batteries of anti-aircraft missiles deployed at least around Caracas. His personal security had to have surrendered since Maduro and his wife were shown on video meekly being handcuffed by Delta Forces.
That there was no military response suggests that at least the top Venezuelan military brass have been persuaded by the US to stand down, raising hopes there might be a peaceful transition to a new, US-friendly government.  But as I had written in the above-mentioned letter, “However, because of a host of reasons – the fragmented opposition; the rentier military establishment refusing to step aside; the presence of numerous armed groups – colectivos, sindicatos, FARC and ELN guerillas, empowered cooperatives, etc. – even such a transition will not be peaceful.” The “rentier military establishment” refers to the numerous military personnel Maduro had appointed to controlling positions in state and private corporations and which positions they may protect by deploying troops under their command.
I believe my November conclusion still holds: “What this means for us is that in any scenario that will unfold, the turmoil in the country will create a new tsunami of ‘refugees’ into surrounding countries, including Guyana. But this time there will be a significant number of operatives who had forcefully supported the Maduro regime and would be fearful of retribution. These can become the core of violent non-state terrorist groups operating domestically and towards any new Venezuelan regime.  As such, we repeat our calls for securing our borders that have been described as ‘porous’ even after our half of Ankoko was seized in 1966, and we have now experienced terrorist bombings in GT.
While we trust in God (and zones of peace), let us tie our camel.”