Next, move on to Venezuela

Everyone in the region is waiting for the next American foot to drop in their standoff with Venezuela to eradicate the Cartel de los Soles narco-syndicate headed by Nicolás Maduro. Starting in August, they have inexorably tightened their noose – comprised of one-quarter of their entire navy, including their largest and most modern aircraft carrier, the Gerald R Ford – in the Caribbean Sea. In our November 10 editorial, “Scenarios for US-Venezuelan Operation”, we presented five possibilities as envisaged by Vijay Prashad, an analyst friendly to Venezuela. Presently, while the jury is still out as to which scenario will play out, from the latest developments, it would appear that the analyst was correct in predicting it would not be the “Panama Option”, which most observers believe to be the most likely.
“In 1989, the US bombed Panama City and sent in special operations troops to capture Manuel Noriega, Panama’s military leader, and bring him to a US prison while US-backed politicians took over the country. Such an operation would be harder to replicate in Venezuela: its military is far stronger, trained for protracted, asymmetric conflicts, and the country boasts sophisticated air defence systems (notably the Russian S-300VM and Buk-M2E surface-to-air systems). Any US air campaign would face sustained defence, making the prospect of downed aircraft – a major loss of face – one Washington is unlikely to risk.”
We just learnt from a report in the credible New York Times that President Trump personally called Maduro last week, and we can conclude that the American leader is at least willing to conduct dual-track diplomacy to offer him a way out of facing the full force of the massed armada. Earlier, he had revealed that the CIA was already operating inside Venezuela, and he was considering action on “land” to complement his navy blowing narco-boats out of the water. Against the background of Trump’s other forays against those leaders he considers to be acting against American interests – such as Iran, where he bombed their nuclear programme off the face of the earth – it might well have been an ultimatum delivered. But what about the caution offered by Prashad, to the effect that an invasion is “unlikely”?
Another analyst fleshed out Prashad’s thesis: “Venezuela hosts one of the most complex networks of armed non-state actors in the Western Hemisphere. Start with the colectivos – far-left paramilitary groups numbering 8000 individuals operating in 16 states and controlling approximately 10 per cent of Venezuelan cities. These aren’t poorly armed street gangs; they possess AK-47s, submachine guns, fragmentation grenades, and tear gas – much of it supplied directly by the Venezuelan Government.
“Colombian guerrilla organisations have also established a significant presence on Venezuelan territory. The National Liberation Army (ELN) maintains operations in 13 Venezuelan states… with armed cells in roughly 10 per cent of Venezuela’s more than 300 municipalities, with roughly 1000 fighters in Venezuela and 6000 members in total. Segunda Marquetalia, dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), operates with an estimated 1000 members. Other FARC dissident factions add approximately 2000 more fighters. These groups maintain Marxist-Leninist, anti-imperialist ideologies and view the United States as the primary threat to revolutionary movements. Combined, these irregular forces are in the tens of thousands with substantial weapons, territorial control, and operational experience.
“It should be stressed that Venezuela’s official military doctrine has been explicitly designed around asymmetric warfare against a hypothetical US invasion since the Chávez era. The strategy assumes initial conventional defeat followed by sustained guerrilla resistance – making occupation costly and politically unsustainable.
“Nevertheless, Venezuela won’t just roll over without a conventional fight. It boasts mobile Russian S-300VM and Buk-M2E air defence systems and KH-31 anti-ship missiles. Additionally, Venezuela boasts 24 Su-30MK2V Flanker fighters (approximately 21 operational) capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and, critically, components of Russia’s C4ISR system – integrated digital warfare networks previously shared only with Belarus.
“Most significantly, Russia signed a comprehensive 10-year strategic partnership with Venezuela in May 2025, ratified in October 2025, covering more than 350 bilateral agreements on security, defence, and technology. Russian cargo aircraft have recently been landing in Caracas with additional military supplies. In October 2025, Maduro requested Russian assistance in enhancing air defences, restoring Su-30 aircraft, and acquiring missiles.”
Forewarned is forearmed.