Post-Maduro Venezuela scenarios

In the wake of its removal of Nicolás Maduro to NY to face narco-trafficking charges, the US has attempted to reduce kinetic adverse reactions within Venezuela by not insisting on regime change tout court. In accepting VP Delcy Rodriguez being sworn in as acting President and deciding to confine its relationship to controlling the oil sector, which she evidently accepts, they have a credible Chavista figure to blunt radical anti-American uprisings that can precipitate new waves of refugees. While elections have been proposed by some to restore “democracy”, any near-term political campaigning would certainly have the contesting parties debating their stance on their Essequibo Border Controversy and possibly pressure Opposition favourite Maria Machado to abandon her pro-ICJ stance to resolve the same.
President Trump accepts that economic stability is critical to the US controlling Venezuelan oil by blunting protests and has moved swiftly to encourage oil companies to re-enter Venezuela to ramp up its production from its present 900,000 barrels per day. While Chevron, which had remained because of a sanctions exemption, will go along, a more positive signal was Exxon indicating it will immediately dispatch a team into Venezuela to examine its options. The US commitment to use the proceeds from the first 50M barrels of oil to reimburse companies like Exxon and ConocoPhillips for judgements they had obtained for assets seized by the Chavista regime offers these companies a windfall they can use to start production.
These are very important developments for Guyana, and as a small state in the global system whose sovereignty is ironically threatened by Venezuela, we should continue supporting non-interference in national affairs and a peaceful, lawful resolution of the Venezuela crisis. But we must be pragmatic in avoiding the sanctimonious condemnation of the US action that is being pushed by some – even within Caricom. We commend Jamaica’s PM Andrew Holness’ formulation: “My job… is to keep Jamaica safe. Not to steer into waters for which we don’t have to go. Not to invite problems on ourselves when we have our own problems to deal with.” We have experienced Venezuela kicking us in the face after we went the extra mile and signed the Argyll Agreement to maintain the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace. Economically, the US control over the Venezuelan 300B of crude should signal the world that decarbonisation efforts will be extended, thus allowing us to reap the benefits of our oil over a much longer period. In the short term, the Venezuelan sour heavy crude will not impact our sweet light crude, and in the longer term, while an increased US-backed increased Venezuelan oil supply might lower oil prices, this will be balanced by the continuing market demand fostered.
We must prepare for the possible post-Venezuela scenarios – a fragmented Venezuela and the subsequent spill-over risks; a nationalist rebound with renewed border claims; and, more positively, normalisation, which will be subject to negotiation pressure. Our diplomatic and defence responses must be tailored accordingly since we must be ready whether Venezuela stabilises or not.
In terms of our national security, as we have consistently advocated, we should continue to utilise the Venezuelan crisis as a catalyst for boosting our defences. As such, with US and European assistance, we should continue expanding our coast guard and maritime surveillance capabilities, which become even more critical to protect our offshore oil FPSOs. We suggest a UAV (drone) squadron for EEZ and border monitoring. We repeat our suggestion that we establish a military base in NW Essequibo to boost our rapid response, to which the US can have access through an explicit agreement as a longer-term deterrence to Venezuelan revanchism, which will not disappear. We should also retain the presence of GDF personnel along the Venezuelan border that were augmented after the US military intervention. We must have a plan in place for Venezuelan refugee flows across that border, which has remained “porous” for far too long.
We should also begin planning post-ICJ enforcement diplomacy since even a partial ICJ ruling will lock in long-term security and trigger responses from forces in Venezuela.  Our cooperation with Brazil should be augmented and formalised since she has in the past, and will in the future, share many of our concerns and fears vis-à-vis Venezuela.