Suspend pilot for 24 months, implement Int’l Collision Regulations/Convention – BoI report

A Board of Inquiry (BoI) into the October 8 allision (nautical term for the running of one ship upon another ship/object that is stationary) of a vessel into the Demerara Harbour Bridge (DHB) which rendered the ageing structure inoperable for several days and resulted in billions of dollars in damages, has recommended, among other things, that the vessel’s pilot be suspended for 24 months and the implementation of International Collision Regulations/Conventions to which Guyana is a signatory.

“Pilot Kenneth Cort must be suspended for a period of not less than 24 months and only be allowed to return to duty after a process of recertification, assessment of his competency to operate as a pilot by MARAD [Maritime Administration Department],” the BoI chaired by Captain Joseph Lewis outlined in its report.
A report on the Preliminary Inquiry into the allision which was conducted from October 10-13, containing 21 recommendations, was released by the Government on Tuesday.
After the allision, Cort, who was immediately suspended, was tested for drugs and alcohol use but those tests returned negative. He has over two decades of experience.
At the time, the vessel was under the control and command of Captain Freddy Mendoza, advised by Cort. Reports indicate that at around 2:00h on the day in question a Panama-registered fuel vessel – MT Tradewind Passion– which transports fuel for the Guyana Oil Company (GuyOil), while heading south, crashed into the DHB, despite desperate calls to ‘drop anchor’ from the Shift Supervisor Andy Duke.

Duke, who was in one of the lookout towers, tried desperately to communicate with the pilot without success. He eventually had to jump from the booth in an effort to save his own life. He fractured his leg in the process and was hospitalised.
The other men who were working at the bottom of the bridge, including Mechanical Maintenance Engineer Ahmad Khan, had to run for their lives. The final cost of damages to the DHB is estimated at US$5 million and continuing, the report noted.
Given the psychological impact the allision has had on DHB’s staff who were on duty at the time, with some of them still feeling heavily traumatised, the BoI said that clinical interventions may become necessary.
The allision caused extensive damage to critical components of the bridge which left it inoperable, resulting in thousands of passengers and tons of agricultural produce stranded on both sides of the river.
While repairs were being carried out on the bridge which was reopened on October 10, water taxis which normally operated for 12 hours, were allowed to operate for 24 hours.

Findings
According to the BoI, the probable cause of the allision of the vessel with the DHB were as a result of the bridge teams’ exclusive reliance on the contract pilot’s incorrect navigational direction, and their total reliance on looking at the bridge and disregarding alarms of the electronic system on the vessel as it approached the bridge.
The BoI found that the captain failed to assume command of the vessel in a timely manner and manoeuvre it safely into the channel and through the transit, that the passage plan provided adequate information for safe navigation of the bridge zone but was not properly executed and monitored, that at the time of the allision MARAD had no oversight of river pilots; hence the safety of vessel’s operations beyond the southern limits were not guaranteed, that there was no clear path of communication on the vessel’s bridge as the inquiry found several persons were giving commands at the same time, thereby contributing to chaos on the bridge and that the vessel was not equipped with a bow thruster which could have enhanced its manoeuvrability, thereby steering it away from the DHB or alternatively reducing the impact of the allision.
The seven-member BoI further found that the contract pilot was known to have an arrogant disposition and was oftentimes very difficult to communicate with. “This is similarly reported as being the general disposition of the Master of Tradewind Passion, yet no reports nor warnings, disciplinary actions were taken against either party.”
The ship’s Bell Book records for October 8, the BoI noted, are ad variance to the VDR retrieved from the ship’s bridge. “The second officer indicated that a scrap was kept on board the ship during transit which is later transcribed into the Bell Book. This strongly suggests that there was tampering of the records,” the Board said.
Further, it concluded that, “The VDR hardware was also removed from the bridge and crew members initially refused to hand over information to the members of the Board. The Guyana Shipping Act provided for the ‘Collision Regulations’ to be followed. However, no such regulations have been promulgated.”

Recommendations
Among the recommendations made by the BoI were that with immediate effect, the River Pilotage Service should come under the administration of MARAD; and that pilots should be subjected to annual medical fitness tests including vision (colour blindness to be part of), hearing tests and periodical psychological evaluation of all transit pilots.
They advised that MARAD and the competent authority should enlist MARAD pilots who are certified for Berbice Bridge transit to be the pilots for the DHB Corporation (DHBC) transit until such time other MARAD pilots are certified for the DHBC transit.
“The DHBC should review the arrangement and size of the cluster piles to provide for most robust protection of the retractor area of the bridge and consider adjusting the height of the pedestal of the lights so as to avoid background lights from interfering with mariner’s line of sight of all transit lights,” another recommendation read.
The BoI went on to recommend the following: that night work in way of welding must not be done during ship transit; and that the DHB retraction schedule, when prepared by the DHBC, should be approved by MARAD before publication.
According to other recommendations, more DHBC staff on duty in the retraction area should be equipped with radio communication devices and night shift supervisor provided with night vision binoculars since the night shift supervisor found it very difficult to identify the vessel when he first observed it moving west of the transit area.
As such, the BoI, therefore, recommended that the DHBC must work in collaboration with the Georgetown Lighthouse to identify errant vessels in a timely manner so that early warnings could be relayed. Recommendation Eight stated that all single screw convention size vessels transiting the DHB should be tug assisted.
According to recommendation nine, “No vessels with steering, mechanical and adverse stability condition deficiencies must be allowed to transit the DHB unless such deficiencies are verified by MARAD and contingencies are in place to facilitate transit.”
The inquiry said that the DHBC and Guyana National Shipping Corporation were not equipped with any documented reports of pilots and ship masters conduct that were not in compliance with good practices for safe transit of the DHB although there were numerous verbal reports of such and had such reports been reported to relevant authorities for action, the pilot would not have been onboard the Tradewind Passion.
Therefore, with immediate effect, the BoI advised that all shipping agencies, DHBC and MARAD must set policies and guidelines for all mariners transiting the DHB and all reports of breach of such policies must be documented, investigated and appropriate actions taken. Included in the other recommendations given by the Board were that all vessels transiting the DHBC should be mandated to possess Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance policies; that international Collision Regulations/Convention to which Guyana is party must be implemented as a matter of priority, in light of impending increase in marine traffic and that the acquisition and operationalisation of adequate and appropriate vessel monitoring systems, and maritime surveillance systems should be prioritised for all maritime zones, including internal waters.
The DHB, a 6074-foot-long floating toll bridge, was commissioned on July 2, 1968. The structure, which was given a life span of 10 years, is 54 years old. (G1)