We just commemorated “Remembrance Day” for WWI. From his recently published “Why we fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace”, Chris Blattman advises that “while there’s a reason for every war and a war for every reason, there are only so many logical ways that the incentives for peace can break down. There are five main reasons it happens: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, misperceptions, uncertainty, and commitment problems…” Below are excerpts that may help us in Guyana choose peace and not war.
1.Unchecked interests
Like gang leaders, autocrats and oligarchs can ignore many of the costs of war because the soldiers and citizens who pay them cannot hold their leaders to account. Unchecked leaders are also free to pursue their private interests, and this can lead them to go to war against their society’s interests… Democratic societies are vulnerable to unchecked interests as well, such as a president who hopes to boost popularity ahead of an election, military leaders who see opportunity in a conflict, or extremist splinter factions who want to spoil the peace.
2. Intangible incentives
Sometimes violence can deliver value, such as glory, renown, or justice. Any ideological rewards might offset the costs of war, spurring sides to fight instead of bargain. Consider status. A desire for glory and dominance has driven kings of the past and tyrants of the present to warfare… Unaccountable leaders are not the problem if the populace shares nationalistic and ideological goals. When they do, the leader is faithfully representing the group’s ideals by going to war. Most commonly, however, rulers and their cabals seek personal and national glory.
3. Misperceptions
A third way rivals get the costs and benefits of war wrong is when they form and hold mistaken views, even when evidence piles up to the contrary. In this scenario decision-makers do not stop acting strategically, but rather strategize from a set of delusional and biased beliefs. We often misperceive others. Humans are prone to demonizing their enemies and attributing to them the worst intentions. We often treat opponents too harshly—repressing protesters with deadly force, striking insurgent leaders with imprecise drones—and then wonder why they angrily reject the miserable deal on offer. People are especially prone to these errors when the conflict follows ethnic and religious cleavages:
Other times we misperceive ourselves, overestimating chances of victory or underestimating the costs of a fight. Sometimes we owe this overconfidence to psychological biases.
4. Uncertainty
Misperceptions are important, but generally speaking, people attribute too much influence to mistakes, and too little to uncertainty. Most leaders simply do not know the strength or resolve of the other side. Likewise, in war, enemies do not know the other’s strength or resolve. They may be bluffing. The optimal approach is to play what is called a mixed strategy: occasionally you ought to fold; occasionally you ought to call (risking war). Each time is a gamble. If uncertainty explains why wars break out, it also helps to explain why the average war is so brief—typically counted in weeks rather than years. Once the uncertainty dissipates, each side prefers to bargain rather than fight.
5. Commitment problems
Commitment problems comprise the fifth and final strategic dilemma…(They) arise whenever one side believes its opponent has an incentive to renege on a peace deal—to use some future advantage to attack. Knowing this, a deal unravels before it can even begin.
A classic example is the preventative war, where one side expects its adversary to become more powerful in the future and renegotiate the deal in their favor. One side capitalizes on its ability to strike while still strong.
Another common mistake is to blame inept and ideological leaders alone. This is the dominant account of war after war. But in all these cases a set of subtler strategic factors—unchecked political systems, uncertainty, and commitment problems—narrowed the range of peaceful settlements to a sliver, to the point that glory-seeking, overconfident leaders and chance events could take their societies to war.
We need both the psychological and strategic explanations if we are to understand why fighting happens.”
