– constitutes gross defiance of the parliamentary fundamental, fiduciary functionality
Last Monday, Guyana and the world witnessed an occurrence in the country’s political history – an unprecedented and ill-fated event in the National Assembly. Today’s article however, sought to address only one aspect of what appears to have resulted from last Monday’s parliamentary fiasco, in the following day’s sitting.
The Speaker of the National Assembly, seemed to have exercised his powers within the parameters of what constitutes his own intellectual interpretation of such, and had ordered the house to proceed with the voting process – in which the sum of $23.3 billion of the budget estimates were approved for the fiscal year 2018.
It was noted that this order was carried out without having regards for the degree of fundamental paramountcy of national importance to have had these estimates thoroughly scrutinised and debated by the elected parliamentary Opposition despite the suspension of Parliament the previous day. This scenario, is characterised as an unequivocally, unfortunate outcome with respect to the pureness of intent of the monies approved therein – accountability and transparency – an important element of responsibility owed to the nation by the legislature.
Role of the Legislature in the National Budget process
In a democratic regime, Parliaments generally have three basic functions; representation, lawmaking and oversight. With respect to the function of representation – Parliaments represent the diversity of individuals and groups in society. Secondly, as the supreme lawmaking institution, the rules by which society is governed are made there. And thirdly, they are designed to oversee Executive spending and performance (World Bank Institute, 2005).
Constitutions and/or budget system laws elaborate on the budgetary roles and powers of the Legislature. Budgetary practices and legal constraints vary greatly across countries (Lienert, 2005; Stapenhurst et al 2008; Wehner, 2006). Moreover, in developing countries especially, the role of the Legislature is changing (Posner and Park, 2007), with Parliaments playing a more active role in budget matters. In the interest of promoting good governance, and fiscal transparency – the active engagement in the budget process by the legislature is of critical importance.
Extending on the oversight function of the Parliament, this function is in effect the ‘checks and balance’ function. In so doing, it seeks to ensure that programmes are executed legally, effectively and for the purposes for which they were intended. To this end, legislative oversight tools include the question period for Ministers, the use of public accounts committees, investigatory and departmental committees, auditor generals and other court type powers.
It is noteworthy to mention that the increased national and international attention on Government corruption in recent years has led to a greater focus on this aspect of parliamentary responsibility (Johnson, 2010).
Pre-Budget discussions in Parliament
Some countries – for example, France, Brazil and Sweden, have a pre-budget debate in Parliament around the middle of the year preceding the new budget year. The purpose of which – in good practice – the Legislature should be provided with an opportunity for a pre-budget review of the Government’s main budget orientations and proposals for the upcoming fiscal year (cited from IMF Technical and Manuals Note, 2010).
The table below highlights Brazil as an example on Pre-budget debates and guidelines laws:
Time allowed for budget scrutiny by Parliament
Parliaments typically take two to three months to review the detailed budget, prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year. This time period is usually adequate, with a much longer period being eight months. Of course this would depend on country specifics with regards to the intricacies of the structure and size of an economy among other factors.
In the interest of good practice – according to the IMF Technical and Manuals Note (2010), a paper produced by the fiscal affairs department; the Government should submit its draft annual budget to Parliament two to four months in advance of the beginning of the new fiscal year. And, Parliament should be allowed two to four months to scrutinise, debate, and propose alternative budgetary policies (within limits of cost), prior to adopting and promulgating the annual budget before the new fiscal year begins.
Parliamentary model of power
There are several models of parliamentary power, however, in the context of the unscrutinised $23.3 billion; it mirrors features of a ‘rubber stamp legislature’. In this framework, the Parliament simply endorses the decisions made elsewhere in the political system and/or the executive branch, often associated with communist or totalitarian nations.
Conclusion
It is within these respects, that the reasons given by the Speaker for not allowing a debate and effectively circumventing the scrutiny of $23.3 billion (almost nine per cent of the budget) prior to its approval; constitutes gross defiance of the parliamentary fundamental, fiduciary functionality. The fact that the size of the budget is larger every year inevitably warrants more time to be extended to thoroughly scrutinise and debate the National Budget.
The author is the holder of a MSc. Degree in Business Management, with concentration in Global Finance, Financial Markets, Institutions and Banking from a UK university of international standing
