US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Guyana last Thursday helped to clarify the Donald Trump Administration’s position on Venezuela’s attempts to seize Essequibo and our territorial waters off its coast. Pres Trump is known for his skepticism towards committing American forces in foreign military encounters. However, Rubio’s statements suggest that Maduro’s violation of international norms, and even an ICJ explicit warning, might have disturbed a tripwire, suggesting the US might move beyond verbal support if Maduro’s ongoing hybrid war against us takes a kinetic turn.
Rubio reiterated, earlier, American declarations supporting our position: that Venezuela was making “threats [that] are based on illegitimate territorial claims.” Asked as to what would the US do in face of a Venezuelan attack, Rubio was quite unequivocal: “It would be a very bad day for the Venezuelan regime if they were to attack Guyana or attack ExxonMobil or anything like it. It would be a very bad day or a very bad week for them, and it would not end well for them.” This was repeated on several other occasions, and removes any ambiguity about the nature of the US reaction. At one point, he said, “We have a big navy and we have commitments that exist today with Guyana.” He suggested these military ties would only be strengthened moving forward. “We want to build on those, expand on those.”
In turn, Pres Ali responded, when asked about the nature of his private discussions with Rubio: “I am very pleased at the reassurance of the U.S. in ensuring the safeguard of our territorial integrity and sovereignty. The threats from Venezuela were specifically discussed.”
According to the US State Department, Secty Rubio signed a security agreement with our Foreign Minister Hugh Todd that would enhance intelligence sharing and military-to-military cooperation. Very significantly, the signing came as the U.S. Navy was conducting exercises with the Guyanese Navy in our exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which a Venezuelan Navy corvette had violated on March 1 to threaten an Exxon FPSO.
There have been valid concerns raised about relying so heavily on the US coming to our rescue, especially at a time when the Trump Administration has adumbrated a totally transactional approach to its foreign policy commitments. In that vein, we must note Rubio’s candid inclusion of Venezuela’s threat to “attack ExxonMobil” as much as violating our EEZ being the rationale for invoking the US Navy as part of the response to Venezuelan aggression. As Pres Trump has declared explicitly in efforts to end the Ukraine War, protecting US companies that are exploiting local resources is a rationale for receiving American military protection. They will be protecting American interests. On that ground, we would more than qualify, since the ExxonMobil consortium exploiting the 11B boe (and counting) in the Stabroek Block is a sweetheart deal par excellence. We also note that, back in 1999, when the original contract was signed by Janet Jagan, she had to have swallowed hard to invite companies she had railed against for half a century.
But even with our 11-billion -plus boe reserves, we must consider Venezuela’s 300B barrels of proven oil, which are by far the largest reserves in the world, and which dwarfs ours. We have to accept that the US wants to control those reserves, since that would give it great leverage in the power struggle with China and other bloc in the coming decades. There are two ways in which the US achieves that goal: firstly, by helping to replace the socialist Maduro regime through application of sanctions and support for the friendly Venezuelan opposition. Up to now, this has not worked. The other is suggested by the willingness of Maduro to accept the return of US oil major Chevron, which is shipping 240,000 bpd to the US. While Trump ostentatiously cancelled the Biden-reissued licence, he extended it to May 27 but applied a 25% tariff on other countries that purchase Venezuelan oil. It is possible that Maduro might agree to the return of other US oil majors through which the US would have “peaceful” control of Venezuelan oil as in pre-Chavez days.
As such, we must heed the old folk wisdom: “Believe in God; but tie your camel.” We must strengthen our alliance with the US, but simultaneously hasten our efforts to defend Essequibo by intensifying changes in our military doctrine and force structure, to wage a successful asymmetrical campaign to give pause to Venezuelan adventurism.
