In 1972, the staunch anti-communist US President Richard Nixon flew to Mao’s communist China after twenty-five years of no contact between the two nations, because he wanted to counterpoise the latter country against its arch rival Russia. Nixon could make that move because his impeccable anti-communist reputation precluded any domestic sandbagging for being “soft” on China – as, for instance, the liberal JFK would have been.
In examining US Pres Trump’s strategy towards Venezuela – which should be of paramount interest because of Maduro’s ongoing hybrid war against us – we have to consider the possibility that he might attempt to “pull off a Nixon” vis-a-vis that country. It is still very early in the day, but there are already some signs of such a rapprochement developing. We must consider our options towards such an eventuality.
In early January, before the inauguration of either Trump or Maduro, there were welcome signs that regime change might be in the air for Venezuela, after President Biden entertained Opposition Candidate Edmundo Gonzalez at the White House as the “President-elect” of Venezuela. Pres Trump and his hardline anti-Maduro Secretary of State Rubio must have taken into consideration the inability of Gonzalez to even return to Venezuela with an entourage of Latin American ex-presidents to give him legitimacy.
Then there were the less-than-stellar protests organized by Marìa Corrina Machado before and on the day of Maduro’s inauguration. She had to stage a purported “momentary” detention to gain attention of the foreign media. Trump would remember that his all-out backing of Juan Guaido as the President of Venezuela ended ineffectually and ignominiously after the 2018 elections. The latter had to be flown to Florida from Colombia in 2023, after being ejected from an international conference discussing the upcoming Venezuelan elections. He has since been living there quite luxuriously.
Among the entities funded by USAID that displayed the “incredible level of waste and corruption” in USAID complained of by Elon Musk was the post-2019 Venezuelan Opposition, where hundreds of millions were siphoned off from the US$1B+ expended.
Trump, however, sent his envoy Richard Grenell to Caracas on a special mission: to meet Maduro directly to negotiate the release of six Americans who had been imprisoned for allegedly planning to assassinate the Venezuelan President. Trump himself announced Grenell’s success, and added that Venezuela had “agreed to receive all Venezuelans camped in the United States under an irregular immigration status.”
This must have already been negotiated. While Grenell said, “The only reward for Maduro was my presence: the first senior US official to visit the country in years,” that was certainly not the case. Venezuelan Attorney General Tarek William Saab boasted, “If President Donald Trump’s special envoy comes to discuss diplomatic issues and requests an audience with the president – who ended up receiving him in the office of the Miraflores Palace – what does that imply in formal, diplomatic, public and communication terms?”
He crowed that this left the Opposition in a “bad light”. Maria Machado, conceded that Grenell’s meeting with Maduro was “a terrible look, but it is what it is.”
As one foreign policy expert explained, “Since 2019, Washington recognised Juan Guaidó and then the 2015 National Assembly as legitimate representatives of Venezuela. Recognition is a matter of practical engagement. The US maintains relations with governments that it does not consider legitimate — such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia under Putin. Diplomatic recognition is distinct from political approval.”
While strategic one- upmanship might have been Nixon’s rationale for breaking the ice with China, there are several inducements for Trump. If he concedes that the stick of regime change – even if successful, as in Iraq – might be messy, then he may try the carrot.
We must note that the licence to Chevron, to ship a quarter of Venezuela’s oil production to the US, was automatically rolled over under Trump, who had said only a month earlier that the US did not need Venezuelan oil. But the latter can be leveraged against Canada’s protests against Trump’s 25% tariffs, since both are heavy crude, needed to produce diesel.
If Trump were to extend licences to other US and EU oil companies, this might squeeze out both China and Russia, which would also further the US strategic interests while increasing its influence over the Maduro regime. Expansion of the economy should facilitate the absorption of Venezuelan deportees. We should also expect less sabre-rattling from Maduro with Trump’s propensity to manners “uppity” leaders, like we saw recently with Colombia’s Petro.
