While there’s a reason for every war and a war for every reason, there are only so many logical ways that the incentives for peace can break down. There are five main reasons it happens and each eliminates the incentives for compromise in a distinct way.
1. Unchecked interests: Autocrats and oligarchs can ignore many of the costs of war, because the soldiers and citizens who pay them cannot hold their leaders to account. They are quick to use violence, because others pay much of the price. Democratic societies are vulnerable to unchecked interests as well, such as a president who hopes to boost popularity ahead of an election, military leaders who see opportunity in a conflict, or extremist splinter factions who want to spoil the peace. Dictators are the most extreme and dangerous of the lot, because they are accountable to the fewest people and bear the least costs.
2. Intangible incentives: Sometimes violence can deliver value, such as glory, renown, or justice. Any ideological rewards might offset the costs of war, spurring sides to fight instead of bargain. Consider status. A desire for glory and dominance has driven kings of the past and tyrants of the present to warfare. Our natural condition is conflict and competition, but most of the time this jostling is not violent. Enemies prefer to loathe in peace.
Unaccountable leaders are not the problem if the populace shares nationalistic and ideological goals. When they do, the leader is faithfully representing the group’s ideals by going to war. Most commonly, however, rulers and their cabals seek personal and national glory.
Another example of intangible incentives is the value societies place on certain pieces of land. There are times when a territory is hallowed. In those cases, many fight because the idea of compromising over a sacred space or ethnic homeland is unfathomable.
3. Misperceptions: A third way rivals get the costs and benefits of war wrong is when they form and hold mistaken views, even when evidence piles up to the contrary. In this scenario, decision-makers do not stop acting strategically, but rather strategise from a set of delusional and biased beliefs.
Other times we misperceive ourselves, overestimating chances of victory or underestimating the costs of a fight. Sometimes we owe this overconfidence to psychological biases. Other times it arises from an institutional problem that insulates decision-makers from bad news.
4. Uncertainty: Misperceptions are important, but generally speaking, people attribute too much influence to mistakes, and too little to uncertainty. Granted, war is so ruinous that both sides ought to invest enormous time and energy in discerning their rival’s strength and resolve. And they do – this is the function of diplomacy and intelligence. Moreover, no nation wants to be mistaken as weak. To avoid attack, most rivals signal their true strength through military exercises, missile tests, and (if necessary) skirmishes.
More importantly, it is hard to trust any signal from a rival. While no nation wants to be underestimated, everyone would like to be overestimated. In war, enemies do not know the other’s strength or resolve. They may be bluffing. The optimal approach is to play what is called a mixed strategy: occasionally you ought to fold; occasionally you ought to call (risking war). Each time is a gamble. If uncertainty explains why wars break out, it also helps to explain why the average war is so brief—typically counted in weeks rather than years. Once the uncertainty dissipates, each side prefers to bargain rather than fight.
5. Commitment problems: Commitment problems comprise the fifth and final strategic dilemma – one that lies behind many of history’s longest wars. Commitment problems arise whenever one side believes its opponent has an incentive to renege on a peace deal –to use some future advantage to attack. Knowing this, a deal unravels before it can even begin. A classic example is the preventative war, where one side expects its adversary to become more powerful in the future and renegotiate the deal in their favour. One side capitalises on its ability to strike while still strong.
(Adapted from “Why we fight: the Roots of War and the Paths to Peace” by Chris Blattman)
