Existential threat from Venezuela remains

Last Thursday, President Irfaan Ali addressed the GDF officers’ conference under the theme “Transforming the Force to Better Confront the Nation’s Present and Future Challenges by Enhancing Its Awareness, Adaptability and Agility Capabilities.” Committing to continue the enhancement of our national forces across all domains, he emphasised a strategic shift toward technology-driven defence, including artificial intelligence and enhanced intelligence capabilities. Significantly, he took pains to note, “The present situation in Venezuela does not remove or diminish the threat to Guyana’s territory… Guyana must not drop its guard. Guyana must not blink… Readiness is not something you scramble to assemble when trouble arrives. It is something you build quietly, steadily, and professionally.”
I am heartened. Following the extraction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by US Special Forces to face narco-trafficking charges in the US, I wrote last month, “We must prepare for the possible post-Venezuela scenarios – a fragmented Venezuela and the subsequent spill-over risks; a nationalist rebound with renewed border claims; and, more positively, normalisation, which will be subject to negotiation pressure. Our diplomatic and defence responses must be tailored accordingly since we must be ready whether Venezuela stabilises or not.
“In terms of our national security, as we have consistently advocated, we should continue to utilise the Venezuelan crisis as a catalyst for boosting our defences. As such, with US and European assistance, we should continue expanding our coast guard and maritime surveillance capabilities, which become even more critical to protect our offshore oil FPSOs. We suggest a UAV (drone) squadron for EEZ and border monitoring. We repeat our suggestion that we establish a military base in NW Essequibo to boost our rapid response, to which the US can have access through an explicit agreement as a longer-term deterrence to Venezuelan revanchism, which will not disappear. We should also retain the presence of GDF personnel along the Venezuelan border that were augmented after the US military intervention. We must have a plan in place for Venezuelan refugee flows across that border, which has remained “porous” for far too long.
“We should also begin planning post-ICJ enforcement diplomacy since even a partial ICJ ruling will lock in long-term security and trigger responses from forces in Venezuela. Our cooperation with Brazil should be augmented and formalised since she has in the past, and will in the future, share many of our concerns and fears vis-à-vis Venezuela.”
With the US accepting the accession of Maduro’s deputy Delcy Rodriguez as acting president and evidently working out a modus vivendi on the operations of the Venezuelan oil industry, there has been no overt “fragmentation” to date. But it would be naïve to believe that the institutions created by the Chavista regime over three decades – the armed, far-left colectivos, the armed sindicatos, and the communes (50,000), along with the state military apparatus whose leadership has been bought out through rentierism, etc – have disappeared. There would also be restive elements in the ruling PSUV party, which controls the National Assembly, led by Delcy’s brother, Jorge Rodriguez. There is the opposition Unitary Platform, credibly adjudged to have won the 2024 presidential elections under the nominal leadership of Edmundo Gonzalez, standing in for the pro-capitalist and right-wing Maria Machado after she was arbitrarily disqualified. Her party has now been joined by the formidable centrist opposition leader Henrique Capriles, which adds another dimension to the fissures. If true, Machado’s announcement that she expects elections later this year will catalyse these imminent divisions, in which the Border Controversy will feature as a low-hanging fruit to be exploited along with the American presence.
Even if there are no elections, the announcement that the ICJ will commence hearings on the merits of the case on the Venezuelan Border Controversy on May 4 will ensure those divisions manifest themselves. Delcy Rodriguez has been a most vociferous supporter of Maduro’s “annexation” of Essequibo and, in fact, presented her country’s rejection of the ICJ’s role in resolving the controversy over the validity of the 1899 Arbitral Award. While, like all Venezuelans, Machado also supports the Venezuelan position on the award, she is on record as supporting the ICJ’s intervention.
The refusal to release details of the December 2023 helicopter that killed five high-ranking military officers should hopefully spur discussion of my suggested drone squadron and military base in Essequibo since the possibility of the helicopter controls being jammed by the Venezuelans will be revived. We must discourage any upcoming Venezuelan adventurism.