Innovative Lessons from Ukraine that can be used to defend our borders

Dear Editor,
Venezuela is ranked 46th globally in military strength and possesses the fourth largest military in Latin America; however, widespread equipment cannibalisation and severe underfunding mean that its actual operational readiness often falls short of its numbers on paper, with approximately 123,000 personnel spread across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Guard, backed by 8000 official reservists and a vast civilian Bolivarian Militia whose true active size is estimated to be between 200,000 and 300,000.
In contrast, Guyana is ranked 148th globally, with approximately 3400 active-duty members and 670 in reserve; our annual defence budget is roughly 0.9 per cent of GDP.
Simply put, we do not have any military power when compared to Venezuela, despite their economic collapse, but we do have terrain, and we can learn from the war in Ukraine. Exploited niches and strategic planning significantly turned the tide against Russia in favour of Ukraine-led innovation.
The key word here is “innovation”, something we, as a country, need to possess in order to shape a defence strategy that is strong and capable. It is possible that we can deter a conventional Venezuelan invasion by adopting Ukraine’s asymmetric defence doctrines, specifically by prioritising indigenous, low-cost drone programmes; mobile anti-air and anti-ship missile units; and fortified “defence-in-depth” to exploit the dense, logistics-draining jungle terrain of the Essequibo.
Ukraine has demonstrated how an outmanned, outgunned nation can neutralise superior conventional forces using agile technology. The Government should prioritise the development and procurement of autonomous maritime and aerial drones. In a theatre defined by vast, difficult-to-patrol coastlines and riverways, unmanned systems offer a highly cost-effective method to disrupt Venezuelan naval movements, protect offshore oil rigs, and strike strategic targets.
Instead of relying solely on large, centralised bases, the GDF should train for decentralised, small-unit guerrilla tactics. The Essequibo region is dense with rivers and deep jungle. By fortifying key choke points and relying on mobile, localised resistance, Guyana can stretch and choke Venezuelan supply lines, making any prolonged occupation prohibitively expensive and logistically impossible for Caracas.
There should also be investments in EW (Electronic Warfare) capabilities to jam enemy communications and protect its own command structures from being compromised, integrating trained civilian reserves and local militias to support the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) in local defence and logistical support. Equipping border communities with encrypted communications and secure reporting networks enables an invaluable localised early-warning and intelligence-gathering system.
So far, what I am seeing is only our security being bolstered by US Southern Command and regional partners like Brazil. Ukraine’s experience emphasises that combining independent sovereign defence capabilities with robust international alliances is the most effective deterrent against invasion; so, too, should be the same goal for defending our territory!
Essequibo belongs to Guyana!

Kind regards,
Dev Hary